Globalisation and the rise of East Asia have accelerated the migration of Chinese populations across the AsiaPacific rim. Ethnic Chinese populations from highly diverse sub-ethnic, socio-economic and political backgrounds are increasingly aggregated in major cities throughout the region. Nonetheless, there remains insufficient attention to the implications of greater economic interdependence and accelerated population movement upon the political cultures of host nations such as Australia, especially in the context of ensuing spatial and economic concentrations of activity.
Globalisation is at play through the increasing rapidity of movement of peoples across countries and the increasing presence of non-permanent political actors in the Australian labour market and polity. In recognising some of the implications of globalisation for economic systems, it becomes necessary to investigate how cities integrate and harness radically mobile formations of domestic and transnational capital, along with social agents who are heavily engaged in transnational economic flows. The relationship between global processes and 'ethnic' or 'enclave' economies can be understood through the evolving scholarship on Chinatowns. In particular, the development of concepts such as the 'ethnoburb' (Li 1998 (Li , 2006 and the 'ethnopolis' (Laguerre 2000) have re-characterised ethnic enclaves as anchors for global processes and global cities as aggregations of transnational niches (Kwok 2008, 469) . Re-characterisation of the enclave economy also implies the need to pay greater attention to the role of urban politics in providing processes of engagement between social agents embedded in these networks with those engaged in domestic political cultures (Stoker 1998, 126 Such an approach recognises the complex interdependence between political and economic settings, and expresses an interest in Chinese involvement in Australian politics in a sense that is neither confined to 'formal' (Lam 2004) nor 'conventional' (Barnes, Kaase & Allerbeck 1979) forms of political participation. Instead of approaching 'the political' through an interest in electoral politics or the mobilisation of community groups and interests, this paper is focused at the interactions between social agents who operate through the apparatus of government. Our concern remains with the nature of Australian citizenship as experienced by social agents from minority perspectives, but turns to their differentiated experiences of the Australian political system. During an epoch of unprecedented global mobility, analysing Chinese Australian social agents and community organisations through such a lens repositions ethnicity-based community and civic formations as potentially classstratified through differentiated economic and transnational mobilities (Zhou & Lin 2005) .
The terrain of this discourse is a particular urban political approach called urban regime theory, what Clarence Stone defined as 'the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions ' (1989, p.229) . It should be emphasised that the usefulness of urban regime theory arises here for very specific reasons. Certainly, it does not presume that network arrangements -which tie social agents from enclave economies and from political parties (or government) together -are regimes in the sense that they lead to comprehensive influence, or control of political decision-making. Urban regime theory is useful for other reasons (see Stoker 1998 , Mossberger & Stoker 2001 . The first reason is that an urban regime approach recognises the significance of informal networks rather than formal institutions; it thus looks to comprehend the structural bridges between public control of government and private control of economic resources. The second reason is that, while regime arrangements depend upon active collaboration, it assumes stable and durable relationships between urban elites and political actors (spanning successive governments) can be built, especially where they are tied together through global flows. The third reason is that urban regime theory denotes the significance of each particular metropolitan context. Implications for the relevant political culture by such arrangements become defined through network participants, and may be distinct in character depending upon the metropolitan location.
More broadly, an urban regime approach theorises cultural formations with urban density in mind, acknowledging the city as the domain where the citizenship and identity claims of groups are recurrently, and in some instances, competitively articulated. In addition, the spatial dimensions of interaction, between community or business leaders and formal political agents, recognises that much of the capacity in developing mechanisms of political access and transnational engagement requires support and endorsement by political decision-makers and authoritative bodies, at the state and local government level. Such an approach is guided by Saskia Sassen's (1991 research on the competition between global cities as nodes of the global economy, in particular, her analysis in relation to the transforming role of government. This trend she captures through the phrase denationalisation -a phenomenon that has occurred deep inside the nation-state gearing political authority towards global economic engagement. 1 This case study, in addition, demonstrates the potential relevance and impact of sub-ethnic diversity in shaping competing transnational political orientations at the urban political level.
Chinese Australian urban politics amidst Brisbane's demographic heterogeneity
Numerous metropolitan locations around the globe support highly heterogeneous diasporic Chinese populations. In Australia, the diversification in nations of origin for Chinese migrants is evident following the Colombo Plan , the abandonment of the White Australia Policy (1973) and the rise of multicultural Australia (Ho & Kee 1988; Kee 1988; Ho & Coughlan 1997 Though it has often been construed as a matter of national identity, the primacy of this issue
in Taiwanese In this dispute, allegations were made that QCF had provided inadequate community leadership. According to some this was for more than a decade. Its alleged precarious reputation was apparent in its incapacity to manage sub-ethnic political tensions; in particular, its alleged failure to accommodate greater Mainland Chinese integration into its membership structure. M, a QCF delegate intimated:
I'm also aware of now, through QCF, there's official difference (of) opinion between the Taiwanese group and the pro-China group. And I think we're at the moment (in) a bit of a stew because the Mainland China group wants to join QCF and so the current Taiwanese ones want to back off.
G suggested that the cross-strait issue had been an important source of political fragmentation amongst Chinese associations in Queensland, 'Even now there's already a split, in regards to Taiwan, Chinese, and Mainland Chinese. There's already a split there'. H agreed, 'I mean, you can see a lot of activity will be totally organised and involved by one community and it's the other community will not be involved in it. And this is one thing which QCF is going to overcome'. Some attributed this fracture to an aggressive pro-independence stance held by certain groups within the Taiwanese community. G suggested, 'You know, we got some right-wing Chinese from Taiwan that is influencing others. Just one of those sad things to see
happen. But what can we do? Except to try to pacify them, and try and work together with them as best as we could.' Others attributed it to competition amongst political party intermediaries for the support of sub-ethnic factions.
QCF's domestic focus notably constrained its capacity to manage cross-strait tensions, with key QCF delegates emphasising that member organisations needed to set their transnational politics aside. H confirmed that QCF's focus upon domestic issues meant that it refused to take sides in the cross-strait issue:
Being the Chinese community (it) is inevitable that some of our people in Queensland are also active in terms of the political activity between Mainland China and Taiwan… This has been debated and discussed in QCF many, many times. And we make it quite clear that QCF are not, or will not, be involved in the political activity between Mainland China and Taiwan.
Others such as E emphasised a role for a peak body in managing the potential scope of this conflict:
'Eventually some issue will divide the Chinese community up into parts, like if there was someone stupid enough to push a button across the Chinese strait. That will immediately divide the Chinese community within an hour… within an hour of that happen segregation instated (sic). How do we manage that as a community?'
In contrast, counter-allegations claimed that QCUC's aims were almost exactly the same as QCF, and that it was initiated by a small group of community leaders with the intention of competing and eventually replacing the existing peak body. The prominent if not dominant role of Mainland Chinese migrants in the QCUC also raised questions about the organisation's capacity to host dialogue on cross-strait matters.
Comparison of the organisational aims strongly suggests that QCUC was started with the intention of competing for the peak representative role (QCF 2006; QCUC 2005) . Some explicit differences are evident in organisational structure. The constituting documents confirm that QCF membership depended upon delegates from member associations. Where QCF's organisational structure primarily supports and enhances the capacity of associational leaders, QCUC could be considered more structurally inclusive as it also supports individual membership. The wording and priority of the two aims and objectives also highlight some 
Organisational competition based upon political access
The case study is significant because the focus upon political capacity-building by QCUC meant that political engagement became a key area regarding the legitimation of QCF's peak Since that time, the vociferousness of the dispute has diminished with the two peak organisations collaborating through activities such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, fundraising for the Sichuan Earthquake and Queensland Flood Appeals. Nonetheless, the tensions which produced the dispute impart an important window into the competition for political access by elite community leaders, organisations and enclave networks.
The dispute between QCF and QCUC goes to the heart of the potential impact of Chinese leader, privately asserted that business relations had not been a sufficient focus for QCF:
A lot of people know us. Even people in China know us. Consul people, embassy, know us, government know us, so they all want us to be part of them. But when I go to their (QCF) meeting I can see the job that they did -totally different. Totally different! QCF mainly focus on -let the Chinese community involve in Australian system (sic).
Consider also that at least seven of twelve delegates of QCF were, at the time, members of the Based upon the Brisbane case study, two crucial claims about the character of Chinese Australian urban politics emerge. The first stems from an expansion in the number of community organisations, as well as an expansion in their adaptive functions. The broadening array of organisational purposes has been triggered by major transformations in diasporic Chinese communities themselves (and the spaces that Chinese migratory populations inhabit).
As Edgar Wickberg claimed, since World War II families have replaced sojourning males;
Chinese immigrants have brought an increasing diversity of skills, resources and status; and migration is sourced from a growing multitude of nations and sub-ethnic backgrounds (1994, p.76) . We might add to this observation, the lived dimensions of cultural 'hybridisation', which empower a greater range of social agents to cross group boundaries, and also implicitly creates the political space for boundary maintenance by various social agents.
This growing demographic heterogeneity poses important questions to community groups and Secondly, the competition for political access and the outpouring of urban political conflict in this case study, highlights the tenacity of those specific network arrangements in bridging public and private spheres. We may consider the effects of globalisation upon the way we understand the Australian political system and the apparatus of government as actors in the global economic order. Chinese migrations have impacted upon the economic capability of major cities through the migration of transnational economic actors, the development of enclave economies, as well as a reorientation by major cities to the global dimensions of economic activity. These patterns create opportunities for new governance mechanisms and increasingly complex approaches to urban politics as the governing bodies of these cities adapt.
While this paper does not posit (as part of its approach to urban regime theory) an emptying out of governance functions, it does seek to reinforce the relevance of globalisation in the development of urban regime arrangements incorporating Chinese Australian community actors and organisations. According to Stone (2005, p.331) , urban regime theory ultimately looks to understand how viable and durable arrangements for engagement and governance are created and claims the development of a regime is based upon at least the following three conditions:
• an agenda,
• resource adequacy, and
• an alignment of actors.
The conditions for the durability of a regime are further enhanced by 'selective incentives', which directly benefit network participants along the way (2005, p.320). Though Stone constructs urban regimes as largely 'contingent' (2005, p.325) , he also recognises that regimes are 'structural' in the sense that they are compelled by structural forces such as those generated through global processes. Thus, in coming to terms with the global orientation of enclave economies, we can understand the recurrent potential for regime arrangements to emerge.
The significance of this for governmental and political agents -who are increasingly attuned to the role of ethnically-based enclave economies as anchors for global processes -implies increasing interest in modes of resource exchange that have little to do with the transfer of information or the intermediation capacity of non-elite immigrant organisations (Poppelaars 2007, p.20) . The influence of the global economy emerges in creating the conditions for network arrangements that sustain durable and recurrent means of interaction, between public and private social agents vested in the economic development of enclave economies, and networks tied to international business and trade. In addition, social agents engaged in these kinds of network and regime arrangements, be they politicians, business or community leaders, may act or be coopted, as agents or interested parties, in building trade, business or government-to-government ties. These 'opportunities' are likely to sustain themselves, whether or not trends in migration and multicultural scholarship are interested in political participation and civic engagement.
Conclusion
The urban regime arrangements considered in this paper provide both opportunities and risks In exploring how regimes are established, Stone (2005) reconsidered the significance of agenda-setting as a structure for the agency of participants, and the need to comprehend the durability of a regime based upon its capacity to draw together the resources necessary to fulfil or implement such an agenda. This area is perhaps one of the great challenges for local and state governments, as well as political leaders in their engagement with urban politics.
The agenda for the establishment of network arrangements between public and private ethnic business interests have often been framed by a symbolic commitment to a version of multiculturalism that has suffered from long-standing and broadly-accepted conceptual flaws.
One has been its institutionalisation of difference and its reification of cultural expression, which has diminished the relevance of building democratic cultures through greater civic engagement, and in particular, the potential to utilise community resources to bridge gaps in the distribution of politically-relevant social capital. The second is that newer and supplementary concepts, such as 'productive diversity' (Bertone, Esposto & Turner 1998) , have in some instances allowed the economic and political dimensions of network engagement to be conflated. In numerous instances, such as in Brisbane, Queensland, this has bifurcated government priorities in relation to multicultural engagement towards more entrenched and more prosperous communities.
The final challenge is that settings within public discourse are a major constraint to exploring Australian citizenship in the context of globalisation. In spite of emergent discourses on postnational citizenship, our political identities remain tied to geography -we each remain citizens of somewhere. The citizen is a juridical, cultural and political status, a social position reflecting distribution of power and resources vested by the nation-state, but also a social boundary between us-and-them, arising because of migration or fortune of birth, managed by instruments of the state that range from constitutional protections through the enforcement of human rights covenants and trade agreements to the historical antecedents of national cultures. Pervasively human bodies are arbitrated between the inclusion and exclusion of a range of legal protections, in effect the rights and obligations secured by the formal boundaries of citizenship (Linklater 1998) . Therefore, social inequalities can in fact be ingrained where social policies governing cultural difference fail to allocate proper recognition of the role of global processes in transforming urban and metropolitan landscapes.
Certainly the international education market sits at this conceptual precipice. Current iterations of Australian citizenship, multiculturalism and social inclusion remain locked into modes of interpretation that are territorially-bound, at a time when they need to reorient to the effects of globalisation. The starting point would be deeper, smarter engagement through public discourse and political leadership about how Australia's future is tied to national myths and concepts at ease with cultural diversity, and leadership willing to commit to a notion of citizenship that actively seeks more diverse civic and political inclusion.
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